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Book Reviews 
THE CIVIC DIMENSIONS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM* 
THE CIVIC CONSTITUTION: CIVIC VISIONS AND 
STRUGGLES IN THE PATH TOWARD 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY. By Elizabeth 
Beaumont.1 Oxford University Press. 2014. Pp. xvi + 343. 
$49.95. 
PEOPLING THE CONSTITUTION. John E. Finn.2 
University Press of Kansas, 2014. Pp. xv + 350. $39.95. 
George Thomas3 
The American Constitution begins by pronouncing itself an 
act of “We the People” and derives its legitimacy from its 
ratification by the people. And yet the people rarely appear in the 
body of the Constitution and citizenship goes largely 
unmentioned. The perplexing place of the people within the 
constitutional scheme is reflected in its closing article. For while 
the Preamble begins as an act of the people, Article VII closes by 
stating that the Constitution will be “established” once the 
conventions of nine states have ratified it. Whether this would be 
an act of the people directly, or whether it would occur by way of 
the existing state legislatures, was left for the states to decide (and, 
perhaps, to the people within them). The fact that the people 
themselves are largely unmentioned in the Constitution does not 
necessarily mean they were neglected. The same cannot be said 
about constitutional scholarship, where citizens have long been 
*  Special thanks to the Salvatori Center at Claremont McKenna College for 
sponsoring the workshop that spawned this and the following two reviews. 
 1. Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota. 
 2. Professor of Government, Wesleyan University. 
 3. Associate Professor of Government, Claremont McKenna College. 
61 
 
GEORGE THOMAS FINN REVIEW_DRAFT 1 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/29/2014 3:04 PM 
62 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 30:61 
neglected. Even in studies that putatively focus on the people, 
such as Larry Kramer’s The People Themselves and Bruce 
Ackerman’s three volume We the People, the people are not, in 
fact, the central focus.4 
Elizabeth Beaumont’s The Civic Constitution and John 
Finn’s Peopling the Constitution, coincidentally but happily 
coming out at the same time, speak to the central importance of 
citizens in creating and maintaining the American Constitution. 
Yet far more than simply filling in the gaps and seeking to 
illuminate the place of the people in the constitutional order, 
these works give us a deeper understanding of American 
constitutionalism and speak to the very nature of the 
constitutional enterprise. Both Beaumont and Finn argue for a 
civic understanding of the Constitution. As Finn describes it, the 
Civic Constitution’s primary ambition “is to constitute a political 
community in which citizens shoulder a significant part of the 
responsibility for achieving and maintaining a constitutional way 
of life” (p. 1). This is in contrast to what Finn describes as the 
Juridic Constitution, which he prefers to “legal,” as “juridic” 
better captures the fact that judges and lawyers not only bear the 
primary responsibility for maintaining the Constitution, but that 
such an understanding comes at the expense of a more robust civic 
sense of the Constitution. Beaumont’s book complements this 
understanding by illuminating how “civic founders” have played 
an important role in shaping constitutional meaning and 
understandings, including constitutional text and membership in 
the civic community, which has been an important part of building 
constitutional democracy in America (p. 7). I treat these works 
together as offering us an understanding of The Civic 
Constitution from both a theoretical and historical perspective, 
but I should be clear that they are not always in agreement; 
indeed, at times they are in marked tension with one another. 
In this essay, I first take up what it means to view the 
Constitution in civic terms. I then focus on questions of 
constitutional foundations, change, and development from a civic 
perspective. I conclude by briefly speaking to the importance of 
civic education that both of these works point to as an essential, 
 4. LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 
(1991); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); WE THE 
PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014). Ackerman's third volume does focus 
more on the people than the first two. But see WAYNE MOORE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
AND POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1996).  
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and deeply neglected, feature of maintaining the American 
Constitution. 
THE CIVIC CONSTITUTION 
To apprehend the Constitution in civic terms is an attempt to 
understand the Constitution as a whole, or from a synoptic point 
of view; it is an effort to understand the kind of polity the 
Constitution brings into being, which includes things that are part 
of the Constitution—civil society and political culture, for 
example—but are not always clearly associated with it. Such an 
understanding places the text of the Constitution within the whole 
of the American constitutional order. This is not to neglect the 
text. On the contrary, the text itself begins as an act of the people, 
but this act of the people is an attempt to constitute a particular 
polity, which includes a particular kind of people. The Civic 
Constitution thus includes the text, but it also includes the 
practices the text attempts to bring into being. As Finn argues, 
“constituting embraces four interrelated projects—the creation of 
texts, institutions, citizens, and cultures” (p. 28). For Finn this is 
not unique to the Civic Constitution. All constitutions attempt to 
do these things. What is unique about Finn’s approach is the 
bringing to light of a more capacious understanding of the act of 
“constitution,” which includes the configuration of citizens and 
culture to sustain a commitment to constitutional norms, 
principles, and values. 
The text itself adumbrates some of these principles and 
values: the Fourteenth Amendment’s commitment to equality, or 
the First Amendment’s commitment to liberty of conscience, for 
example. Read through the lens of the Civic Constitution, parts of 
the constitutional text might be seen more lucidly and fully. Pieces 
of the text, in fact, should strike us as odd when understood in 
Juridic terms. The guarantee of a republican form of government 
to every state in the Union is not legally enforceable by way of 
courts; it thus stands out as a non-enforceable part of the 
Constitution. Yet when understood from a civic lens, this 
provision speaks to an important marker of civic identity: we 
define ourselves as a republican people and guarantee that as a 
civic practice to all states within the Union. Viewed through a 
civic lens this is also a reminder that the people are responsible 
for guaranteeing this promise. One of the great virtues of 
Beaumont’s historical investigation is to illustrate how even 
judicially enforceable textual clauses are more fully understood 
by way of the Civic Constitution. Beaumont illustrates this with  
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regard to the Bill of Rights, the Civil War Amendments, and the 
Nineteenth Amendment, demonstrating how antifederalists, 
abolitionists, and suffragists, nurtured and shaped constitutional 
understandings that would come to be reflected in textual 
amendments. The Nineteenth Amendment is of particular 
interest because it is often seen as of little constitutional 
significance—it gave women the vote, and enforced that by way 
of courts, but otherwise left the Constitution more or less intact. 
And, from a Juridic perspective, we might say this is just so. Yet 
this would miss the larger civic implications of the amendment—
a textual marker of what Beaumont calls a “civic refounding”: 
“suffragists also initiated a broader new beginning for the political 
community through their struggle to reinvent the basic terms of 
American constitutionalism—what the Constitution is and for 
whom and for what it was made” (p. 213). In rejecting the 
“separate spheres” status quo—in which women were understood 
to find their place in the republican scheme in private life—
suffragists profoundly altered the makeup of civil society, 
included altering how the “private” and “public” spheres were 
understood. This was, Beaumont argues, a much more profound 
transformation of American life (civic and private) than simply 
giving women the vote. 
 In this manner, the Civic Constitution speaks not only to 
“who” we are, but what “we” believe, and what “we” aspire to. 
Of course, who “we” are and what “we” aspire to is a much-
disputed question, but understanding such disputes historically 
can help us understand who we have been, which is also part of 
thinking about who we are and who we wish to become (civic 
education, as I will discuss below, is central to constitutional 
maintenance in this regard). For Finn, this requires an active 
“tending” on the part of the people; it also, at times, seems to 
suggest a uniformity of understanding that Beaumont, I suspect, 
would be hesitant to embrace. Yet I am not sure that Finn and 
Beaumont are as far apart as they might seem at first glance. 
Finn’s insistence that the Civic Constitution does speak to who 
“we” are and what “we believe” allows for vigorous dispute; 
indeed, we might even say it requires it. It also allows for serious 
differences, but not differences on everything. While Beaumont’s 
focus is on civic struggles, she also takes certain commitments—
“free and equal” citizenship, which she draws from Aristotle—as 
essential to American constitutional democracy. The historical 
disputes that Beaumont canvases illuminate the struggle to 
achieve “free and equal citizenship,” something “we” aspire to in 
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Finn’s language, and reveal a more robust civic life than is usually 
associated with the Constitution; yet such disputes have been 
central to maintaining the Constitution and building 
constitutional democracy in America. Reformers from the 
revolutionary generation onward, the “middling people” and 
figures often at the margins of civic life, or in the case of blacks 
and women, excluded from much of it, took up the tasks of 
citizenship: they helped expand and solidify many of the rights we 
take for granted, reframed who and what a citizen was, and forged 
“common sense” constitutional ideals that reflected their vision. 
In the case of abolitionists and suffragists this might be 
readily apparent, but Beaumont reveals how “civic founders” 
were essential in framing the Constitution itself and the Bill of 
Rights that soon followed. Yet the Civic Constitution is not 
revealed at the moment of “founding.” Indeed, it is difficult to 
conceive of a single “moment” of founding, or even “refounding,” 
as the Constitution is in a state of becoming, which raises 
fundamental questions regarding constitutional foundations, 
change, and development. 
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS, CHANGE, AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
A central characteristic of the Civic Constitution is dialectic. 
Even if we begin by saying the people are committed to 
constitutional principles, it is clear that there is no easy agreement 
on just what this commitment entails. And, in fact, Finn insists the 
precise meaning of these commitments cannot be fully described 
(p. 6). This could be a set of “first principles” that define the 
essence of America’s constitutional identity that the people strive 
to live in accord with even while disagreeing about its particular 
contours and application. Certainly, as Beaumont notes, civic 
reformers have often “claimed only to be upholding or reinforcing 
the fundamental principles of an existing Constitution,” and thus 
were committed to its “core principles” (pp. 219, 221). As Finn 
describes it, we are committed to a shared civic life “defined by 
our fidelity to certain norms, principles, and values” (p. 92). The 
commitment to “free and equal citizenship” is central in this 
regard for both Finn and Beaumont. 
Yet the Civic Constitution does not simply unfold—even if in 
a conflicted manner—from foundational constitutional 
commitments and principles. Nor are such principles necessarily 
in tact from the founding moment. Rather, the founding of the 
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Constitution set a larger process in motion. Yet there is nothing 
inevitable about bringing a polity into line with its best 
understanding of itself; it is not the inexorable unfolding of 
History, but the hard labor of building a constitution.5 Beaumont 
captures this civic work, “different visions of free and equal 
citizenship can appear inevitable or fully derivable from ‘first 
principles’ of American constitutionalism now because of the 
extent to which reformers’ civic ideals inescapably shape our 
present constitutional life and worldviews” (p. 24).6 What appears 
obvious now was once deeply contested. As a people, Americans 
have struggled over what it means to be committed to the 
Constitution and these conflicts have themselves shaped the 
Constitution and modified, often profoundly, how we think of 
ourselves and how we think of the Constitution that both shapes 
us and comes to reflect, however partially, who we strive to be as 
a people. 
This is not to say that the Constitution becomes whatever the 
people want it to be, defined by how the people come to define 
themselves. Finn suggests that while constitutional maintenance 
is an ongoing activity vested in the people—and thus not defined 
and configured at the moment of founding—he nonetheless 
argues that commitments made by “We the People” at the 
founding “remain in some way our commitments now and in the 
future” (p. 91). Such commitments determine the national 
character of a people who “assum[e] responsibility for honoring 
constitutional values” (p. 93). Some of these commitments, Finn 
argues, are “foundational” insofar as they reside within our 
commitment to constitutionalism itself. But does this suggest an 
abstract commitment to, say, limited government, human 
equality, and reason and deliberation, so that our constitutional 
commitments do not necessarily run to the particulars of the 
American polity? For both Beaumont and Finn, I think the Civic 
Constitution operates at a somewhat more grounded level. The 
constitutional past is inextricably bound up in the constitutional 
future. How we have understood constitutional ideals and 
constitutional commitments is an essential part of “constitut[ing] 
our constitutional identity” (Finn, p. 112–13). 
 5. Though as Louis Hartz says, a problem with this rendering is that America never 
really sins, “only its inferior self” does. LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN 
AMERICA 31 (1955). 
 6. As Jack Balkin notes, constitutional arguments can move from “off-the-wall” to 
“on-the-wall,” but this turns on constitutional faith and a hope of persuading your fellow 
citizens. JACK BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST 
WORLD 47 (2011).  
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In giving this historical life, Beaumont refines what has been 
dubbed “popular constitutionalism,” particularly in the work of 
Ackerman and Kramer. Curiously, as both Beaumont and Finn 
note, there is actually very little about the people in these 
scholarly accounts. Moreover, in describing American 
constitutional history, both Ackerman and Kramer’s analyses 
lean more toward populism than constitutionalism: the people can 
seemingly engage in unconstrained rule, remaking the 
Constitution as they see fit, so long as it is authentically the 
“people” who engages in such an act. For Ackerman, America is 
identified as a “dualist democracy” where “popular sovereignty” 
is foundational; when the people act as the people they can remake 
the polity in a manner that dissolves distinctions between 
conceptual issues such as constitutional maintenance, 
amendment, transformation, and revolution (Finn, pp. 150–51). 
Beaumont offers a more refined account of “popular 
constitutionalism,” which first illustrates how civic reformers have 
engaged the public and official institutions in constitutional 
dialogue and, second, shows how these reformers “embraced 
constitutionalism as governance by fundamental law” even while 
rejecting “official interpretations” of the Constitution (p. 15). 
Gary Jacobsohn’s examination of “constitutional identity” 
might be helpful in understanding how the civic dimensions of the 
Constitution can be reshaped and altered even while keeping the 
essentials of the constitutional order intact. As Jacobsohn argues, 
constitutional identity emerges dialogically—it is not fully formed 
at the moment of “founding” but emerges over time.7 I think this 
understanding is somewhat different from Ronald Dworkin’s 
famous insistence that we come to apprehend the full meaning of 
constitutional principles by way of moral reasoning.8 In civic 
terms, constitutional ideals and principles are partly constructed 
overtime as “We the People” determine our understandings and 
commitments. The result—in part captured by Jacobsohn’s notion 
of constitutional disharmony—is a continual back and forth 
between past and present, between foundational commitments 
and civic understandings.9 Defining “who” we are is in part a task 
of understanding “who” we have been, which makes the 
 7. GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, CONSTIUTIONAL IDENTITY 7 (2010). 
 8. RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 122 (2006). 
 9. Finn’s civic understanding at times seems an over-correction to the “Juridic 
Constitution.” In contrast, I think the Court plays a healthy role within this dynamic so 
long as we keep in mind that it is one feature of the whole constitutional order. See 
GEORGE THOMAS, THE MADISONIAN CONSTITUTION (2008), where I defend a robust 
role for the judiciary within a departmentalist scheme.  
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constitutional past a deeply important part of our constitutional 
presence, and speaks to the importance of civic education as a 
form of constitutional maintenance. 
CIVIC EDUCATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
MAINTENANCE 
The Civic Constitution thus calls for a more robust form of 
civic education than is usually associated with the Constitution. 
As James Fleming and Linda McClain argue in Ordered Liberty, 
“the realization of the Constitution’s ends and the very 
maintenance of the constitutional order requires a formative 
project of cultivating civic virtues in responsible citizens.”10 The 
precise nature of these qualities, and how they can legitimately be 
cultivated, is the source of much argument. Yet this can be done, 
as Beaumont suggests in another work, in an “investigative” 
rather than “inculcative” manner.11 Civic knowledge is essential 
to thoughtful civic participation. If the Constitution is what holds 
Americans together, how we understand “the nature and history 
of our constitutional past will, in turn, shape the meanings we are 
prepared to give to our country’s present and future.”12 
Facing the past—including its ugly side—might actually help 
civic cohesion and belonging. If we consider the interaction 
between the specifics of history and more universal principles, 
attachment to principles may well help citizens engage the 
particulars of the polity: citizens should not simply accept their 
inherited traditions or history. Moreover, the past is central to the 
present and the future of the polity: “the future of constitutional 
identity is inscribed in its past.”13 How we understand our 
Constitution is part of how we understand and define ourselves. 
This includes knowledge of the past, which is essential knowledge 
in wrestling with how we understand and apply the Constitution 
in our current circumstances: there is no escaping constitutional 
judgment, which is a necessary feature of constitutional self-
government (Beaumont, p. 231). We cannot look backward for all 
of our answers and each generation cannot escape the demands 
of maintaining the Constitution, which requires more than asking 
what those of the founding generation thought; it requires current 
 10. JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY 114–15 (2013). 
 11. See ANNE COLBY, ELIZABETH BEAUMONT, THOMAS EHRLICH & JOSH 
CORNGOLD, EDUCATING FOR DEMOCRACY: PREPARING UNDERGRADUATES FOR 
RESPONSIBLE POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT (2007). 
 12. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 37. 
 13. JACOBSOHN, supra note 7, at 349.  
 
GEORGE THOMAS FINN REVIEW_DRAFT 1 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/29/2014 3:04 PM 
2015] BOOK REVIEWS 69 
citizens to think through contested constitutional principles and 
contested civic understandings in light of our fundamental 
constitutional commitments. 
The Constitution is incomplete in this regard. Not necessarily 
through profound failures of constitutional design, but because 
every constitution that seeks to “endure for ages to come” is 
necessarily incomplete: it will always depend on later generations 
to carry it forward, to embrace and preserve its constitutional 
identity and political creed. 
 
 
 
